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Over recent decades, pain has received increasing attention as – with ever 
greater sophistication and rigour – theorists have tried to answer the deep 
and difficult questions it poses. What is pain’s nature? What is its point? In 
what sense is it bad? The papers collected in this volume are a 
contribution to that effort. 
Understanding pain requires addressing two of its most obvious 
but least understood aspects: its unpleasantness and motivational force 
(how, that is, it drives us to behave in certain ways, for example 
withdrawing your hand from hot water). Pain’s unpleasantness and 
motivationality seem closely intertwined. But what is the nature of each, 
and what exactly is their relationship? These questions are the focus of 
Part I. 
A second route to understanding pain is through its connection 
with emotion, on which Part II focuses. For one thing, there appears to be 
overlap in the neural activity subserving pain and emotions. For another, 
just as pain is typically unpleasant, so are certain emotions. Indeed, pain’s 
unpleasantness may involve certain emotions. What, then, is the 
relationship between pain and emotional suffering? In what ways are they 
the same? In what ways different? 
Finally, the atypical can sometimes illuminate the typical, hence 
Part III addresses deviant pain. Chronic pains, for instance, appear not to 
be associated with any physical damage, except perhaps to the nervous 
system. Pains undergone by pain asymbolics appear not to be found 
unpleasant. And the masochist’s pains seem to be wanted, even pleasant. 
Thinking about such cases offers insights into pain’s nature.  
Below we briefly sketch the volume’s three overarching themes, and the 
contributions that follow. 
 
Part I: Pain, Unpleasantess, and Motivation 
Typical pains are unpleasant and motivational. The water become hot, you 
begin to feel pain, its unpleasantness increases, and you lift your hand out. 
Questions about pain’s unpleasantness and motivationality are beginning 
to receive the attention they deserve. In virtue of what are pains 
unpleasant? In virtue of what do they motivate us? What mechanisms 
underlie their unpleasantness and motivationality? What influences these 
features? These questions are the focus of the papers in Part I. 
 The first two chapters are moves in a philosophical debate about 
what makes pains unpleasant. Taking pain to be motivational because 
unpleasant, many explain pain’s unpleasantness in terms of things that 
will also explain its motivationality. The traditional view, for instance, 
appeals to experience-directed desires: your pain’s being unpleasant is 
simply a matter of your disliking it in the sense of wanting it to stop for its 
own sake. But others have recently proposed alternatives. Some say pains 
are motivational (and unpleasant) in virtue of not desires but the 
possession of special intentional contents: imperative contents (according 
to imperativists) by dint of which your pains tell you what to do, or 
evaluative contents (according to evaluativists) by dint of which your 
pains evaluate bodily conditions as bad for you. Others reject such 
intentional accounts and claim, for example, that your pain’s 
unpleasantness and motivationality turn not on its content as such, but on 
the kind of processing its content undergoes. 
 In the first chapter, ‘Imperativism and Pain Intensity’, Colin Klein 
and Manolo Martinez defend imperativism. A pain, they think, motivates 
in virtue of a part of its phenomenal character that consists in possession 
of imperative (rather than indicative) content. Your pains, in short, 
motivate because they are commands from your body: for you to see to it 
that a certain bodily state not exist (on Martinez’s version) or for you to 
protect a certain part of yours (on Klein’s). 
This view, some worry, cannot capture pain’s intensity, since the 
intensity of a command is not a matter of content. Bruiser might shout and 
swear when telling you to stand up, whereas Petal might speak softly and 
say “please”, but that difference is not an intentional difference. 
 Klein and Martinez’s response is two-fold. First, they distinguish 
command intensity from such phenomena as the politeness with which a 
command is expressed and the relative urgency of one command vis-à-vis 
others. Second, they use a possible-worlds model of imperative content to 
explain command intensity as an intentional phenomenon. The basic 
model says an imperative’s content is the set of worlds at which it is 
satisfied. To incorporate intensity, Klein and Martinez argue, the content 
must include a function that ranks worlds. One imperative content, A, 
might be more intense than another, B, because A and B each ranks worlds 
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at which A is satisfied at B’s expense over worlds at which B is satisfied at 
A’s. With this idea in place, Klein and Martinez go on to propose more 
complex functions for more difficult cases; they also consider the bearing 
of their semantics on whether one pain might be not merely more intense 
but twice as intense as another; and they gesture at what it might be in 
virtue of that an experience possesses such a content—at, that is, a 
psychosemantics. 
In Chapter 2, ‘Pain and Theories of Sensory Affect’, Murat 
Aydede and Matthew Fulkerson reject both imperativism and 
evaluativism in favour of the idea that a pain’s unpleasantness and 
motivationality consist in the kind of processing its content undergoes. 
Among their objections to imperativism and evaluativism, a key 
complaint is that neither view explains pain’s intrinsic badness. Consider 
an allodyniac who is being caused agony by innocuous caressing of her 
forearm. Evaluativists say her experience represents to her (falsely) that 
her forearm is in a bad state. But Aydede and Fulkerson argue that this 
fails to explain why she has reason to stop that experience, hence to stop 
the caressing. Why should representations of badness themselves be bad? 
Imperativism, they argue, struggles with similar problems. For why 
should receiving a command from the body itself be bad? And even 
setting aside these normative questions, can imperativism explain pain’s 
motivationality? Commands, Aydede and Fulkerson suggest, are not 
inherently motivational. When the police command a crowd to disperse, 
the crowd might be unmoved. Pain, they argue, is better compared to 
water cannon. 
Instead, Aydede and Fulkerson propose a psychofunctionalist 
account: a pain is unpleasant in virtue of the “m-processing” undergone 
by the sensory information it carries (about bodily states and events). M-
processing is something that happens subpersonally, they explain, hence 
its precise contours should be delineated by science; but Aydede and 
Fulkerson anticipate that m-processing will be an inherently motivational 
mode of processing, specified in terms of the processed information’s 
effects on the organism’s preferences, motor systems, and learning. Hence 
their overall picture is that an unpleasant pain has a belief-like component, 
which carries sensory information about a bodily condition, and a desire-
like component (consisting in that information being m-processed) which 
is not identical to but can be modelled on a personal-level desire for that 
represented bodily condition to cease. And it is in these terms that they 
explain unpleasant pain’s intrinsic badness. Its badness, they argue, 
consists in the frustration of the desire-like component “as registered by” 
the belief-like component. 
The final chapter of this section presents ‘A Neuroscience 
Perspective on Pleasure and Pain’. In this, Dan-Mikael Ellingsen, Morton 
Kringelbach, and Siri Leknes address unpleasure and pleasure – or affect – 
in general. As neuroscientists, their approach is rather different from the 
preceding chapters’; but there are threads of continuity, not least their 
interest in the relationship between affect and motivation. 
The relationship between affect and motivation is, they suggest, 
complex. Distinguishing between ‘liking’ (manifest in feelings of pleasure 
and such facial expressions as lick-lipping) and ‘wanting’ (manifest in 
approach behaviour, for instance) the authors report cases where 
‘wanting’ seems to be increased independently of ‘liking’. In one, 
injections of dopamine into rats’ brains made the rats work harder for a 
sugary treat yet not lick their lips more once they got it; in another, human 
subjects pressed a lever obsessively to cause brain stimulations it wasn’t 
clear they were enjoying. 
There are also, the authors argue, cases showing the looseness of 
the relationship between experiences’ sensory and affective components. 
Some are ordinary, as when chocolate is found pleasurable at first but 
disgusting after over-eating. Others are extraordinary, for instance pain 
asymbolics failing to find even pain unpleasant. There are also cases in 
which experiences seem both pleasant and unpleasant, the authors argue, 
as when winners of sub-optimal prizes say they feel both good and bad, 
putting pressure on the idea of a single continuum between pleasure and 
displeasure. 
Turning to the diverse and flexible determinants of affect, the 
authors argue that these are complex, instructive, and (despite the 
‘liking’/‘wanting’ distinction) tied to motivation. Homeostatic needs can 
seem to be key determinants, as when sodium-depleted rats display 
strong ‘liking’ reactions to intensely salty water. But context is also 
important. On one theory, your pain’s unpleasantness will be reduced if 
you unconsciously deem what’s causing it less important than, say, an 
impending threat. Expectations, associations, and the ‘meanings’ attached 
to events can all, relatedly, play a role – as demonstrated, the authors 
argue, by a range of cases, some involving placebos (see also Corns’ 
chapter), another involving subjects finding gentle touch more pleasurable 
when the toucher is attractive. Such flexibility between stimuli and affect, 
the authors conclude, suggests that affect’s role is less to provide us with 
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information than to motivate us, on the basis of unconscious calculations, 
towards the best actions. 
 
Part 2: Pain and Emotion 
The relation between pain and emotion is a fruitful area for new 
perspectives on affective experience. It has been long thought that physical 
pain has an emotional element: consider for instance the famous IASP 
definition of pain, first suggested in 1964, that it is “[a]n unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.”  Moreover, as Jesse 
Prinz points out in his contribution, philosophers as wide-ranging as 
Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hume all hold that emotions are forms of pain or 
pleasure. This chimes with common-sense thinking: it is widely held 
(albeit sometimes metaphorically) that some forms of emotional suffering 
are themselves painful – we talk of the pain of a broken heart and of 
disappointment, of being pained by grief and loss. Despite these close 
connections, philosophical research has seldom addressed both forms of 
negative affective experience together, preferring instead to focus on one 
form and address the other only in passing. This is both surprising and 
unfortunate: surprising, given that the links between the two seem well-
known and rather obvious; unfortunate, given that research and progress 
in our thinking about one kind of experience might profitably inform our 
thinking about the other. A focus on pain or emotion to the exclusion of 
the other thus threatens to be detrimental to philosophical progress in 
either area.  
The papers in this second section all deal, to a greater or lesser 
extent, with points of comparison and contrast between pain and emotion. 
Michael Brady’s paper – ‘The rationality of emotional and physical 
suffering’ – focuses on the extent to which pain and negative emotion are 
reason-responsive. Brady wishes to defend a traditional view according to 
which forms of emotional suffering – like grief, disappointment, and 
shame – are reason-responsive, and thus assessable as rational or 
irrational, whilst forms of physical suffering – like pain and hunger – are 
not. He thus argues that although there are many ways in which physical 
and emotional suffering are alike, they differ considerably at the 
normative level.  
Brady makes his case by arguing that there are number of 
reasons to think that forms of emotional suffering are reason-responsive; 
he cites introspective, metaethical, and developmental evidence. The first 
kind of evidence suggests that we need to appeal to evaluative content in 
order to distinguish emotions from each other, but that such content is not 
necessary for introspection to distinguish different kinds of physical 
suffering. The second focuses on the idea that the values to which 
emotions respond are best understood on ‘rational sentimentalist’ lines, 
that is, in terms of features that make the emotion rationally appropriate. 
The objects of physical suffering do not admit of a plausible rational 
sentimentalist treatment, however. Finally, he argues that there are good 
developmental reasons for forms of emotional suffering to involve an 
evaluative stance; in particular, this is needed to accommodate the wide 
range of objects that trigger emotions and flexibility in behavioural 
response. Neither of these reasons, he argues, are applicable when we 
consider forms of physical suffering. He maintains, in light of this, that 
there are good reasons to think that emotional suffering is, and physical 
suffering is not, reason-responsive, because emotional suffering is, and 
physical suffering is not, imbued with evaluative content. Brady 
concludes, finally, that this puts pressure on evaluativist accounts of pain 
and other forms of physical suffering, since these hold that pain and 
physical suffering do have evaluative content.   
In ‘The placebo effect’, Jennifer Corns looks at another point of 
comparison between physical and emotional suffering, namely the 
susceptibility of each to the placebo effect. Corns begins her paper by 
pointing out an interesting point of dissimilarity between physical and 
emotional suffering: the former seems susceptible to placebo effects whilst 
the latter is not. Corns thinks this dissimilarity is troubling for attempts to 
characterize the placebo effect, and proceeds to argue that there is no clear 
characterization available and none likely to succeed, whether for pain or 
emotion.  
Corns makes her argument by considering six ways that non-
placebo effects have been distinguished from the placebo effect in the 
existing literature. These are (i) active versus inactive, (ii) real versus fake, 
(iii) pharmacological versus psychosocial, (iv) specific versus non-specific, 
(v) treatment effects versus context effects, and (vi) legitimate healing 
versus illegitimate healing. In each case, Corns argues that there are 
considerable problems with drawing the purported distinction in this 
way. This would seem a troubling conclusion if it was important to have a 
successful characterization of the placebo effect. But Corns goes on to 
argue against the utility of identifying any class of effects as placebo 
effects. In particular, such an identification does not help in the areas 
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where it is claimed to help, namely in (i) randomized control trials, (ii) 
inquiries into the supposed mechanisms of the effect itself, and (iii) 
treatment. Finally, Corns explains away the intuitions we have about there 
being a distinct class of placebo effects, and argues that doing so can help 
to improve our treatment of all kinds of suffering. Far from being useful to 
our medical practices, therefore, the idea that there is such a distinct class 
can hamper effective treatment.  
Jesse Prinz’s paper, ‘What is the affective component of pain?’, 
focuses on one of the central ways that pain and emotion are thought to be 
connected, namely (as mentioned earlier) the idea that pain has both a 
sensory component and an affective component. Common sense and 
scientific theory support this ‘componential’ view of pain, with the 
sensory component purportedly carrying information about the body – 
e.g. that it has been damaged – and the affective component 
corresponding to the feeling of badness or unpleasantness that makes pain 
something to avoid. It is Prinz’s aim to investigate the nature of the 
affective component. He begins by looking accounts which identify the 
affective component with an emotion, first considering and dismissing the 
idea that there is a distinctive emotion characteristic of pain, and then 
arguing against the claim that one or more familiar emotions (such as 
anger and fear) constitute the emotional element. Prinz proposes, instead, 
that negative affect can be identified with negative valence. This is not an 
emotion, although it is a component of some emotions.  
Prinz then reviews different theories of valence, and proposes his 
own account, according to which valence is an ‘inner marker’ that (in the 
case of pain) tells us to act so that the sensory component ceases or stops. 
After defending this account by showing that it can accommodate a wide 
variety of empirical findings, Prinz then discusses a potential objection to 
his account of valence as an internal marker: since such markers are not on 
his view to be identified with feelings, then the affective component of 
pain that is constituted by negative valence is not itself an unpleasant 
feeling: it does not feel bad, in other words. Although this sounds 
paradoxical, Prinz concludes by explaining reasons for doubting that 
pains necessarily involve an unpleasant feeling in addition to their sensory 
component. This means that we should reject a ‘folk platitude’ about pain, 
namely that it is necessarily unpleasant; but, Prinz thinks, doing so can 
lead us to a clearer philosophical view as to why pain is after all bad.  
 
 
 
Part 3: Deviant Pain 
Paradigmatic pains hurt, are felt as being located in one’s body, are 
associated with damage or injury, are motivational, conscious, and more 
besides.  But many of the pains that we experience are not paradigmatic. A 
good theory of pain should be able to account not only for paradigmatic 
pains, but also atypical, deviant pains. Though deviant pains make an 
appearance in the first two parts of the volume, each of the papers in Part 
III provides a targeted, empirically rich discussion of a type of deviant 
pain and its importance for philosophical theories of pain.  
In ‘The unpleasantness of pain for humans and other animals’, 
Adam Shriver takes up the most discussed case of deviant pain within 
philosophy: pains that subjects report not being bothered by. The standard 
interpretation of these deviant pain cases is that the affective component 
of pain is absent, while the dissociable sensory component remains.  
  After giving an overview of the evidence for this type of deviant 
pain, Shriver explains their philosophical relevance. In the philosophy of 
mind, for instance, change in the affective component without a change in 
the sensory component may be thought to raise problems for 
representational theories of pain which require phenomenal qualities to 
supervene on intentional content. In ethics, for instance, our 
understanding of the relationship between the two components arguably 
has implications for what we think is ultimately valuable or disvaluable. 
Dissociations raise further questions in applied ethics about non-humans 
and developing humans who may only experience pain’s sensory 
component. 
Shriver claims that though philosophical questions like these 
cannot be settled by scientific inquiry, neither can they be settled without 
it. He first turns to research aimed at identifying affective pain processing 
in non-humans, but points out how such research is surprisingly limited 
due to difficulties separating behavioural reflexes from affect. 
Accordingly, he argues for a three-pronged approach combining what we 
can learn about the relevant neural mechanisms in humans with both 
behavioural evidence and drug reactivity from humans and non-humans.  
Shriver considers this evidence and ultimately concludes that it is 
currently inconclusive. 
Since answering the philosophical questions raised by 
sensory/affective dissociation is limited by these gaps in our scientific 
understanding, Shriver spends the remainder of the article suggesting 
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ways in which philosophers and scientists have and might further work 
together to fill them. In particular, he focuses on existing research into 
correlations between unpleasantness and both learning and motivation. 
Throughout this discussion, he raises further philosophical questions and 
experiments that he thinks could advance our understanding.  
In the next chapter, ‘When is a pain not a pain? The challenge of 
disorders of consciousness,’ Valerie Hardcastle focuses on the pains of 
patients suffering from disorders of consciousness. The pains experienced 
by these non-conscious, or minimally conscious, patients may be 
understood as another type of atypical, deviant pain, consideration of 
which Hardcastle thinks helps to reveal what is and is not morally 
significant about pain and appropriately targeted for treatment. 
With some reservations about the term, Hardcastle provides an 
overview of disorders of consciousness. Such conditions range from the 
clearly conscious people suffering from locked-in syndrome to the clearly 
non-conscious coma patients. Hardcastle focuses mostly on the middle of 
this spectrum and describes the tests—both behavioral and neural—used 
to determine how conscious such patients might be. Hardcastle is sceptical 
about what this evidence reveals and, more importantly, thinks the results 
are irrelevant for whether these patients are in pain.  
It is, Hardcastle argues, pain processing that matters—both 
morally and for treatment; in particular, it does not matter whether the 
person is experiencing conscious pain or whether the person is conscious. 
Whether pain is being processed can be ascertained independently of 
whether the patient is conscious. Hardcastle argues that consciousness is 
not necessary for moral worth; in particular, it is not necessary for the two 
classic contenders for moral standing: being rational and having interests. 
Moreover, against a more traditional model invoking dedicated pain 
pathways, Hardcastle argues that pain processing is best understood as 
being carried out by massively parallel processing across a complex, 
neural network. She then compares the activity in this network between 
healthy subjects and patients suffering from various disorders of 
consciousness. Her aim is not to adjudicate this evidence, but instead to 
convince us that it is the processing of information across this network 
that matters, and not whether any of this processing is conscious. The final 
section of Hardcastle’s chapter focuses on the negative effects of pain 
processing as evidenced in both premature infants who have undergone 
multiple painful procedures and chronic pain patients. She concludes that 
not treating pain is detrimental to the brain and central nervous system—
and that this is as true and as morally relevant for the deviant pains 
undergone by those suffering from disorders of consciousness as it is for 
paradigmatic pains. 
In the final chapter, ‘The first-person in pain’, Frederique de 
Vignemont focuses on the relationship between pain and bodily 
ownership. She argues that for a pain to be felt as yours it is not necessary 
that the felt pain be localized in a body felt as yours. Pains felt in such an 
“alien” body—a body that you feel, but not as yours—are clearly another 
type of deviant pain.  
De Vignemont presents some of the reasons that it has seemed 
that pain and bodily ownership are instead conceptually inseparable, i.e. 
reasons that have been offered for the claims both that I necessarily feel 
my body as my own whenever I have bodily sensations (including pain) 
and that I necessarily feel a body part as my own when I localize pain 
within it. Consideration of these reasons give rise to two key hypotheses: 
that being able to feel pain and feeling that something is a part of my body 
are jointly sufficient for localizing pain in that something (“the sufficiency 
claim”) and that it is necessary that something be felt as part of my body 
in order for me to feel pain within it (“the necessity claim”). De 
Vignemont tests these hypotheses against three types of cases: the Rubber 
Hand Illusion, ownership delusions, and disownership syndromes. She 
argues that while the sufficiency claim is consistent with these cases, the 
necessity claim is not and should therefore be rejected.  
While pain and bodily ownership thus dissociate, de Vignemont 
argues that threat and bodily ownership do not: to experience a bodily 
threat, I must experience the threatened body as my own. She ultimately 
explains this difference by invoking the different spatial organization of 
the two types of experiences: a threat is always more or less external to the 
body, but pains are not. Threats, unlike pain, are therefore essentially tied 
to sensing the boundaries of one’s body. De Vignemont concludes by 
noting that even if there are rare, deviant cases in which we feel pains in 
alien bodies that we do not feel as our own, we nonetheless always feel the 
pain as our own.  
 
This volume arose from what came to be known as the Pain Project.  
Operating under the aegis of the Pain and the Nature of Minds 
programme at the University of Notre Dame, the Pain Project focused on 
relations among pain, perception, and emotion, and on pain in non-
human animals.  Its core team – Principal Investigators, David Bain and 
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Michael Brady, and their postdoctoral fellow, Jennifer Corns – are 
philosophers at the University of Glasgow.  The broader team, based in 
Glasgow, Paris, and Oslo, comprised philosophers of mind and cognitive 
science, ethicists, neuroscientists, and veterinary scientists.  Over 18 
months, from January 2012 until June 2013, the Project ran four workshops 
and a conference, at which most of the contributions to this volume 
originated. The present volume exhibits the progress being made in 
understanding pain.  But it is also clear that further progress needed.  
There are many questions yet to be answered.  We hope the papers 
collected here stimulate further work into the nature of pain. 
 
